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OIL AND GAS IN THE OCEANS
Herman T. Franssen
IntroductiOlL Petroleum consumption in the world has doubled during
the 1~60's and is likely to double
again in the period from 1970-1980.
To meet these projected demands,
nations will increasingly turn toward
the last largely untapped reservoirs of
oil and gas, the oceans. In the United
States-the major oil producer among
the large non-Communist industrial
countries-new additions to proved
onshore reserves are no longer the
result of newly discovered fields but
are instead caused by improved recovery techniques for already producing wells. .Aside from continuing
improvements in recovery techniques,
new fields with vast petroleum potential are likely to be found in Alaska
and beneath the continental margins
around the United States.
The two other major industrial
giants in the Western World, Western

Europe and Japan, are in a far less
enviable position than the United
States. Neither has large reserves or
even substantial potential petroleum
resources on land and consequently are
largely dependent on the Middle East.
These Persian Gulf States contain more
than one-half of the world's proved oil
reserves, but because of monopolistic
practices and political instability have
been unable to guarantee supplies at a
relatively stable price. Japan and
Europe may succeed in partially diversifying their sources of oil and gas
supplies through offshore development
because liquid hydrocarbons in the
oceans are known to be widely distributed around the world. Marine
geologists believe that the ultimate
recoverable yield of petroleum from
the oceans is at least equal to, and
probably larger than reserves and resources on land. Hence, offshore

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

389
production, which increased sixfold
between 1960-69 and contributes
approximately 18 percent of the current world production of oil, is expected to continue to grow faster than
onshore exploitation and should contribute about 35 percent of total oil
production by 1980. While recent
rapid increases of the posted prices of
crude oil and natural gas will speed up
exploratory activities, uncertainty
about ownership of parts of the
seabed, investment guarantees, and
environmental legislation are bound to
have a retarding effect until such problems have been solved.
Fonnation .of Oil and Gas. Oil is
formed from the remains of marine
plants and animals that rest in finegrained mineral particles such as clay
or carbonate muds deposited on the
sea-floor. Whenever coarse-grained
sediments like sand are present, the
organic substance-under high pressure
and over a period of millions of
years-will migrate into the pervious
sand bodies (reservoir beds), where
the change of environment may turn
the substance into a thick coherent
mass of concrete oil particles.
This process by itself is not sufficient to form oilfields. In order to
concentrate liquid hydrocarbons in

commercially attractive quantities
from broad areas of the reservoir bed
into smaller areas where it can be
tapped, certain geological structures
caused by movements _in the earth's
crust must have been formed to trap _
oil and gas and prevent further migration into pervious sediments. Traps
occur in the form of folds caused by
lateral compression of sediments, by
local bending caused by penetration
of salt pillars (salt domes, diapirs) in
the overlying sediments, and by
regional compaction of thick sediments over buried hills.l
Few areas of the seabed meet all
these conditions for the formation
and accumulation of oil and gas. For
example, one expert maintains that
the North Sea, an area of about
200,000 square nautical miles, probably contains only a few hundred
square miles with petroleum potential. 2
Location of Oil and Gas. The seabed is divided into four distinct areas:
the Continental Shelf, Continental
Slope, Continental Rise, and the
AbYssal Plain or deep-seabed. The
shelf, slope, and rise, although deeply
submerged, are part of the continental

mass.
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Of the different parts of the seabed,
the Continental Shelves, which contain
about one-half of the sedimentary strata
under the continental margins, are expected to have the best potential for oil
and gas accumulation. Not all countries
are equally blessed with extensive
shelves. There are great variations in
width and thickness of sedimentation
and in stratigraphic and structural features which trap the migrating oil and
gas. Generally, sedimentation is deposited off flat coasts, and the shelves
off most mountainous coasts appear. to
be largely erosional in origin because
they are shallowly underlain by bedrock. 3 The Continental Slopes are still
largely a mystery, and except for the
upper slopes, cannot be considered very
favorable prospects for petroleum accumulation. This is because .there are
fewer layers that are coarse-grained
enough to be satisfactory reservoir beds
for the migration of oil. 4 There is
considerable disagreement among marine geologists about the potential for
oil and gas beneath the Continental
Rise. Those arguing against a high petroleum potential on the rise point out that
sediments tend to be low in organic
matter due to oxidation in the very
slowly deposited sediments. Others,
however, believe that the rise may contain substantial oil deposits and that
rich source beds may have been redeposited from the upper slope by
turbidity currents, gravity slides, submarine slumps, and bottom currents. 5
Proponents of this theory also point at
the presence of favorable structures on
the Continental Rise necessary to trap
oil and gas.
Beyond the Continental Rise very
little is known. Deep-sea sedimentation
is generally very thin and thus not likely
to contain much oil. An exception may
be made for semienclosed seas, where
geologists have on several occasions located structures suggestive of potential
oil and gas accumulation beneath the
Abyssal Plain (Gulf of Mexico and the

Mediterranean). At one point a research
ship did find a trace of oil in a core
drilled in water of 11,720 feet in the
Gulf of Mexico. 6
Reserves and Resources. Petroleum
resources can be divided into three basic
groups: proved reserves, supplementary
reserves, and undiscovered potential resources. Proved reserves are those which
geologic and engineering data demonstrate with reasonable certainty to be
recoverable from known reservoirs
under existing economic and operating
conditions. In the United States this is
usually no more than one-third to onefourth of the oil in place. Of the
remaining estimated petroleum in
known reservoirs, the part that may be
recovered with the use of improved
secondary and tertiary techniques is
called supplementary reserves. Additions from supplementary to proved
reserves are subject to technological
developments and, even more on the
margin between prices and costs. Estimates of potential resources are based
on the premise that a given volume or
area of sediments in a basin which is
favorable for hydrocarbon generation
and entrapment should ultimately yield
a predictable volume of hydrocarbons.
These estimates also consider the geological history and characteristics of the
basin and industrial experience in similar but more extensively explored
basins. 7 Geologists know that their
assessments of undiscovered potential
resources are at best educated guesses,
useful only in providing information on
worthwhile exploration areas. The very
size of the ultimate potential recoverable oil and gas, recently estimated at
2,272 billion barrels oil equivalent (in
contrast to proved offshore reserves of
100 billion barrels of oil and 131 billion
cubic feet of natural gas), may be
confusing. 8 It is not the quantity of oil
and gas beneath the seabed but the
economic value of these resources that
is important. At $10 per barrel, the
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potential oil resources would represent a
value of $20 trillion. However, even if
technology were available to exploit all
those resources, the production costs of
a substantial part of the 2,272 billion
barrels might far outweigh the revenues
that could be realized by production.
But, there is still sufficient cause to
be generally optimistic about new offshore discoveries because more than half
of the seabed area in 1,000 feet of water
or less is underlain by young sediments
of a tertiary age which are known to
have a relatively high potential for
petroleum. As much of the large onshore oil and gasfields have already been
discovered, it is likely that the present
ratio of onshoj:'e to offshore reserves of
6 to 1 will change considerably in favor
of new undersea reserves. Even prior to
recent price hikes of crude oil, United
Nations sources indicated that new offshore fields with reserves totaling as
much as 140 billion barrels of recoverable oil would be added to existing
offshore reserves within this decade. 9
Geographical Distribution of High
Potential Areas. North America in general, and the United States in particular,
has been the most active in terms of
offshore oil and gas exploitation. During
the 1950's and 1960's, more than
15,300 wells were drilled off U.S.
coasts, producing over 4.5 billion barrels
of oil worth $8.8 billion. 1 0 In contrast
to onshore areas where new large reserves have become very scarce, new
vast reserves were discovered in offshore
Louisiana, California, and Alaska. Lewis
Weeks estimated total recoverable petroleum resources of North America up to
a depth of 1,000 feet at approximately
20 percent of the world's potential
resources. 11 On the basis of his 1965
study, the North American seabed up to
a depth of 1,000 feet should contain
about 140 billion barrels, plus 60 billion
barrels for petroleum liquids exploitable
by secondary recovery techniques. Estimates made in 1947 by M. King Hub-

bert for the U.S. Continental Shelf were
175 billion barrels, and the Weeks study
puts U.S. petroleum resources beneath
the continental margins at 270 billion
barrels. 12 A recent study by the National Petroleum Council (NPC) projects
potentially recoverable oil and gas in the
United States at respectively 385 billion
barrels and 1,178 trillion cubic feet, of
which about one-half is said to be in
Alaska and in offshore areas. 1 3
Although the U.S. Continental Shelf
is probably the best known in the
world, vast areas remain largely unexplored. For example, the northern
part of the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana
and east Texas, where most of the
American offshore oil is produced, is
quite familiar, but much of the southern
shelf of Texas and the entire Floridian
shelf still remain untested. Geologists
also expect to fmd petroleum resources
on the Continental Slope and Rise as
well as on the Abyssal Plain of the
northern gulf. Southern California was
the major offshore producing area in the
United States prior to the 1950's when
the Gulf States took over the lead. The
area, and in particular the Santa Barbara
Channel, will continue to be among the
more promising offshore prospects in
the country. Discovery of a supergiant
field on the north slope of Alaska, a
field which is estimated to contain as
much as 12.5 billion barrels of oil and
10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, has
drawn attention to the as yet undiscovered petroleum resources in the
Gulf of Alaska and in the Beaufort,
Chukchi, and Bering Seas. 14 Geological
and geophysical surveys off the Atlantic
coast have singled out Georges Bank,
Blake Plateau, and the Baltimore Canyon basin as the areas with potential oil
and gas resources. These, as well as the
Alaskan prospects, have shown sedimentation and folding favorable for the
accumulation of oil and gas, but none of
the prospective areas have been put to
the test of the drill.
Favorable conditions continue on the

392
Canadian side of the border. Already
one discovery of natural gas was made
on Sable Island, about 100 miles east of
Nova Scotia, and Canada's Arctic Circle
may be among the most promising
prospects in North America. One authoritative source indicates that
Canada's Arctic islands may constitute
one of the largest offshore petroleum
provinces in the world. 1 5 During the
decade of the seventies, Canada may
add as much as 56 billion barrels of oil
and 336 trillion cubic feet of gas to its
reserves. 1 6
Outside the United States and Canada, Venezuela is the only major oil
producer in the Western Hemisphere.
Most of its current production is from
Lake Maracaibo, which produces almost
3 million barrels per day. It appears that
production from those fields is leveling
off, and exports from Venezuela have
subsequently declined. The northeastern
shelf may offer good prospects for the
future. Except for Venezuela, Peru,
Trinidad, and Mexico, other offshore
ventures in Latin America have proven
disappointing, and uncertainty about
the role of foreign investment is likely
to have a retarding effect on further
exploration.
Elsewhere one of the most actively
explored areas in recent years has been
the North Sea. Since the beginning of
exploratory activities in 1967, a total of
five giant oilfields have been discovered,
and additional large findings can be
expected, particularly in the northern
part of the sea. A recent estimate puts
potential yield of the North Sea at
approximately 42 billion barrels of oil
and no billion cubic feet of gas,
enough to turn Norway into a net
petroleum exporter and to make the
United Kingdom independent from outside supplies by the early 1980's. 1 7
While no other major discoveries have
been made outside the North Sea, the
Mediterranean, the Black Sea, Celtic
Sea, and a few areas off the Atlantic
coast are known to have potentially

petroliferous sedimentary formations.
Asia has the biggest known offshore
petroleum reserves, and the continental
margins from India to Korea are among
the most promising areas in the world.
Even now, the shallow waters of the
Persian Gulf produce oil at a rate of
more than 2.6 million barrels per day.
Moreover, reservoirs beneath the gulf
contain about 75 percent of the world's
proved offshore reserves. 1 8 Indonesia is
the second biggest producing and oil
exporting region in Asia, and recent
wildcat successes off the coast of Kalimantan and Sumatra have spurred
further activities on the vast, yet mainly
unexplored, Continental Shelves. Exploratory drilling off South Vietnam,
Malaysia, and Thailand has discovered
little, but vast areas of the subcontinent
remain unexplored due to custody disputes and internal political reasons.
Economics of Offshore Oil and Gas
Development. The knowledge that more
than half of the offshore area in 1,000
feet of water or less is underlain by
young sediments of a tertiary age which
have a record of greater average yield
per well and per discovery than the
older sediments 1 9 must be tempered by
some knowledge of the economics of
production. In order to be profitable,
the expected greater yield per well must
offset the usually higher costs of exploration, production, and transportation, which vary considerably with
water depth, distance from land, and
ocean environment. For example, the
operating costs of exploratory drilling
under prevailing weather conditions in
the North Sea may be twice as high as
the cost of drilling at similar depth in
areas with generally favorable weather
conditions such as in Indonesian waters.
In the Arctic Circle, on the other hand,
exploring and producing offshore oil
and gas may again be several times
higher than drilling in the North Sea. 2 0
A United Nations study undertaken in
1970 estimated the average cost of
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exploratory drilling between $350,000 transportation facilities. The high cost
and $2 million per well and for wells of offshore development has an imcurrently being drilled in the North Sea portant bearing on the size of fields that
as much as $5 million?1 Production can be economically exploited.
and completion costs also rise sharply Reservoirs that might be considered rich
with water depth, at least up to 1,500 in recoverable oil or gas on land are not
feet, and are subject to environmental necessarily profitable in the oceans; but
constraints. Hence, production costs again there are considerable regional
may rise from $1.5 million in shallow differences. While relatively small offwaters of 100 feet, to $4 million in 350 shore fields may be profitably exploited
feet and $12 million in 600 feet. 22 in calm waters where production costs
Platforms costing between $1 million are rather low, in the Arctic only fields
and $2 million in the Gulf of Mexico of giant size are commercially attractive.
would cost between 8 and 15 million at It should be noted that 81 percent of
similar depth at Cook Inlet, Alaska. the world's current offshore production
Transportation and storage costs are is a product of giant fields, i.e., fields
also related to water depth and oceanic containing 500 million barrels or
conditions. 'Plus, an underwater pipemore. 2 5
line of only 8-inch in Alaska is 1.5 times
Offshore petroleum exploitation is
particularly subject to technological
more expensive than an average 30-inch
pipeline in the Gulf of Mexico. 2 3
changes which can eventually bring
A recent study on cost variations of
about substantial cost-savings. For exoffshore petroleum development came
ample, the ability to drill up to 60 wells
up with the estimates shown in the table
from one single platform employing
directional drilling techniques is a conbelow. 24 Cost differences, associated
with variations in ocean environment,
siderable improvement over earlier pracare due to the need for specially
tices when only one or a few wells could
be drilled from one platform. Progress
designed equipment, capable of withstanding weather conditions varying in subsea completion, production, and
from areas with year-round calm
servicing will also result in large costweather to stormy winter conditions in
savings in moderately deep and deep
the North Sea and the icy waters of the
waters and under adverse weather condiArctic. Moreover, in some areas bottom
tions in areas where currently fixed
currents are very strong and platforms
platforms are used.
In addition to high development
need to be cemented deep into the
ocean floor, while in other areas there
costs, offshore leases have continued to
are hardly any bottom currents and
rise throughout the decades of the
platforms can rest on the seafloor. Costs
fifties and sixties. In the Gulf of Mexialso increase with water depth and
co, sales of federal wildcat leases went
distance from land and markets because
up from an average of $294 per ac:e in
of increased expense for drilling,
1954 to $3,187 per acre in December
production, servicing, storage, and
1972. 26 The costs of offshore leases are
Cost Components
Cost Multiplying Factor (land = 1)

Exploratory drilling
Development drilling
Production facilities
Pipelines

100 feet

600 feet

1,000 feet

2
2
2
2

2.5·4.0
4.0-5.0
2.0-3.0
2.0·4.0

4.0
5.0·8.0
6.0-16.0
4.0-6.0
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expected to climb even higher when the
remaining areas with oil potential are
divided up into concessions, the ratio
between reserves and production declines, and profit expectations increase_
In the United States there is no alternate to competitive bidding, even if it
means that large amount,s of capital
must be committed for leases many
years before any return on investment
can be realized and with no guarantee of
success. 27
Some have speculated that the combination of regulated domestic prices
and high offshore exploration and development costs have kept profits considerably below those of similar investments on land. 2 8 While exploration and
development costs were higher offshore
than on land, reserve additions per foot
drilled were 2 to 2~ times higher
offshore. 29 Exploration, development,
and production costs were estimated at
$2.34 per barrel for offshore Louisiana
crude, which even at 1970 U.S. prices
was profitable, and at the current price
of more than $5 per barrel for oil
produced from old wells and over $10
for oil from new wells, this is very
profitable indeed!
A major factor slowing down worldwide petroleum development efforts for
many years was the readily available
low-cost Middle Eastern crude. There
was little incentive to engage in costly
deep-water activities, and consequently,
only large fields in shallow waters of less
than 300 feet were exploited. Even
those ventures were barely profitable at
pre-1973 prices. Indeed, as late as January 1972, there was some consensus
among oil company executives that with
the exception of the Santa Barbara
Channel, expansion into water deeper
than 600 feet would lag because of
economic considerations. Many expressed doubt that fields of 200-300
million barrels (a typical good field in
the Gulf of Mexico) would prove economical in deep water, considering the
present state of the art. 3 0 This situation

has markedly changed. While the production cost of Middle Eastern oil is
expected to continue to be less than 20
cents per barrel until the 1980's, the
posted price (the artificial price on
which taxes and royalties are calculated)
rose more than 400 percent between
late 1972 and December 1973 to
$11.65 per barrel for light Arabian
crude. Hence, earlier studies predicting
that oil from other than giant or supergiant fields in shallow waters would not
be able to compete favorably with
alternative sources of supply warrant
complete revision. Several companies
expecting higher future return on investment from developments in deeper
waters have leased tracts off West Africa
in water depth up to 3,000 meters, and
many countries around the world have
sold leases for areas beyond 200 meters.
A major constraint on offshore development is the shortage of skilled
personnel and drilling equipment. Since
July 1973, when the Federal Government allowed prices for newly discovered oil to fluctuate, the demand for
rigs, drilling equipment, and oil pipe
rapidly expanded. Unfortunately this
happened at a time when world demand
for drilling equipment was also at an
all-time high, and steel was in short
supply. Delivery delays ran as long as 18
months. Even though the drill industry
will increase output, it will take a few
years before the new rigs will be on the
market. Experts also agree that there is
a serious shortage of skilled manpower31 caused in part by the fact that
a great deal of the work involves experience, and additional training schools
will not solve the short-term problem.
One industry observer claimed that
shortage of equipment and manpower
will trim expansion down to about
one-half of earlier estimates. 32
Ownership of Seabed Resources and
Security of Investments. To date, at
least 107 nations have confirmed that
the coastal state has jurisdiction over
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minerals in submerged areas adjacent to
its coast. This confirmation has taken
the form of domestic legislation, unilateral declarations, regional treaties,
offshore concessions, or ratification of
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.
Under the terms of the 1958 convention signed and ratified by 39 coastal
states, the Continental Shelf is defmed
as: 33
... the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea to a depth of 200
meters or beyond that limit to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources
of the said areas ....
Hence, by the convention, ownership
of seabed resources is subject to two
qualifications: that the area is "adjacent" and that the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation. During the preparatory
stages of the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conference, several states proposed definite limits to the Continental Shelf, but
none of these could win the majority
needed for adoption. After 6 years the
International Law Commission that had
been charged with the preparatory work
of the conference in 1950 was still
debating the merits of either a depth
limit at the 200-meter isobath or a limit
defined by exploitability.
While a specific depth limit at the
200-meter isobath would have been
definitive, it would have discriminated
against countries with narrow Continental Shelves. Most states on the west
coast of South America, for example,
have generally narrow shelves (in some
areas even as little as 1 mile or less),
while other nations such as Argentina,
Australia, and the entire northern Arctic
region have wide shelves, often extending hundreds of miles out to sea.
Latin American countries, meeting in
Ciudad Trujillo from 15 to 28 March

1956, submitted a compromise formula
which would give the coastal state exclusive jurisdiction over the resources of
submarine areas outside the territorial
sea to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the seabed and subsoil.34 At its eighth
session in 1956, the International Law
Commission adopted the Latin American formula, and, in the interest of
compromise, the Geneva Conference
endorsed the Commission's definition of
the Continental Shelf.3 5
International lawyers greatly differ
over the interpretation of the defmition.
It could be interpreted that as technology improves, the state will be able
to claim that there is no actual limit to
the Continental Shelf. Shigoru Oda, for
example, argued that under this convention it could be inferred that: " ... all
the submarine areas of the world have
been theoretically divided among the
coastal state at the deepest trenches.
This is the logical conclusion to be
drawn from the provisions approved at
the Geneva Convention.,,3 6
On the other hand, the adjacency
clause in the definition could be interpreted as to imply that even if
technology were available, national
jurisdiction cannot be extended unless
the area is situated adjacent to the
coastal state. A significant number of
states voiced support for the concept of
a finite Continental Shelf by express
provisions in their national declarations,
and the International Law Commission
(ILC) which prepared the 1958 Geneva
Conference, clearly did not intend the
exploitability criterion to be a blank
check for any ocean depth. 3 7 Judge
Fitzmaurice, for example, pointed out
that the concept of the Continental
Shelf and the submarine areas did not
allow any interpretation which would
be "tantamount to appropriation of a
part of the high seas," and GarciaAmador, the chairman of the ILC, said
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that "the adjacent areas ended at the
point where the slope down to the
ocean began, which was not much more
than 25 miles from the COast.,,3 8 The
adoption of the 1967 United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 2340, establishing an ad hoc committee to study
the peaceful uses of the seabed and the
ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, indicates that a majority of states recognize that the area
of the seabed over which nations can
exercise sovereignty is limited.
As to the limits of national jurisdiction over seabed resources, Professor
Louis Henkin of Columbia University
argues. that, although national sovereignty is not limited to the 200-meter
isobath, the area is closely limited by
the very use of the term "Continental
Shelf," ... which is itself a geological
term and does not include the Continental Slope, the Continental Rise, or the
Continental Terrace. It is clear the
framers were not intending to limit
themselves strictly to the Continental
Shelf as geologically conceived, but it is
also clear that they were trying not to
get too far away from it either. 3 9
The National Petroleum Council
(NPC), an advisory body of the Department of the Interior of the United
States, has taken the position that under
the 1958 definition of the Continental
Shelf, states are. entitled to claim submarine areas encompassing the continental margins.40 The NPC's position is
based upon the language of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the
records of the International Law Commission and the conference which negotiated and signed it, the practice of a
large number of states in leasing seabed
areas in water depth considerably beyond 200 meters, the records of the
U.S. executive branch and the Senate
during the ratification process, opinions
of the International Court of Justice in
the North Sea Channel Continental
Shelf case, the conclusion of a majority
of professional and scholarly bodies that

have studied the question, and, the
views and recommendations of geology
experts concerning the profound differentiatiOIL between the submerged
continental mass and the deep ocean
· 41
basm.
In the Continental Shelf cases between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Kingdoms of Denmark and the
Netherlands, the International Court of
Justice decided on 20 February 1969,
that:
. .. the rights of the coastal state
in respect of the area of Continental Shelf that constitutes a natural
prolongation of its land territory
into and under the sea exist IPSO
FACTO and AB INITIO, by virtue
of its sovereignty over the land,
and as an extension of it in an
exercise of sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring the seabed
and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an
inherent right. .. 42
The NPC maintains that the Court's
judgment supports the position that
coastal states have exclusive rights over
the natural resources of all the submerged areas which form the underwater prolongation of such nation's land
territory. According to the National
Petroleum Council, geological evidence
proves the Continental Slope and at
least the landward portion of the Continental Rise to constitute a part of the
prolongation of the land territory of the
continent.43
As is so often the case, the solution
to one problem has created others.
Coastal states can now extend national
jurisdiction for the purpose of seabed
resources exploration and exploitation
out to at least a water depth of 200
meters, but now an effort must be made
to determine Continental Shelf boundaries between opposite and adjacent
states in areas of shallow waters. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf is
regulated under article 6 of the 1958
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Convention on the Continenuu Sheli,
which states that:
Where the same continental shelf
is adjacent to the territories of
two or more states whose coasts
are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such states shall be
determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances, the boundary is
the median line, every point of
which is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each state is
measured. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two adjacent states,
the boundary of the continental
shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the
absence of agreement, and unless
another boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the
nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each state is
measured.44
In the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases, the International Court of Justice
rejected the German claim that delimitation of the shelf should be governed by
the principle that each state is entitled
to a just and equitable share, but it also
dismissed a submission by Denmark and
the Netherlands that delimitation
should follow a principle of equidistance in the absence of agreement or
unless another boundary is justified by
special circumstances.45 The Court
found that no one single method of
delimitation was likely to prove satisfactory in all circumstances, that delimitation should be carried out by agreement or by reference to arbitration, and
that it should be effected on equitable
principles. 46

Additional complications in the
process of determining Continenuu
Shelf boundaries arise from the existence of special circumstances such as
trenches in shallow seas, offshore islands
used as basepoints, and islands midway
between two states in narrow shallow
seas. Several bilateral agreements involving special circumstances have been
successfully negotiated between North
Sea countries and between states in the
Persian Gulf area. 4 7 In the East and
South China Seas, however, opposing
claims over islets, straight baselines, ~d
trenches in potentially oil-rich areas,.
/ have at least in one instance evolved
into an ongoing, militarY -clash-between
China and South Vietnam.
In the years following the 1958
Conference on the Law of the Sea,
science and technology advanced to the
degree that the seabed beyond a water
depth of 200 meters became accessible
for mineral exploration, and the actual
mining of seabed and subsoil resources
was expected to follow soon. Clearly
the present chaotic legal void left by the
first Law of the Sea Conference needed
to be filled, and according to a report
issued by the Secretary General of the
United Nations:
... The relevant principles of international law do not provide
detailed guidance and regulations
as regards the exploration and
exploitation of mineral resources
of the area of the seabed and
ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, nor has
precise legal status of that area
been decided or its exact boundaries set ...48
When more knowledge about seabed
resources became available, a growing
number of nations began to extend
national jurisdiction unilaterally, in
several cases up to 200 nautical miles
from the coast.
Following a speech on the wealth of
the seabed by Ambassador Arvid Pardo
in the United Nations, the General
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Assembly established an ad hoc committee to study the peaceful uses of the
seabed and the ocean floor beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. On the
basis of an ad hoc committee report
issued the following year, a permanent
committee was formed, and on 15
December 1969, it, in turn, adopted a
resolution requesting the Secretary
General to review the opinions of member states on convening a new Law of
the Sea Conference to determine the
future regime for the oceans.
By Resolution 2750C, the General
Assembly decided to convene in 1973
such a conference which -among others
-would deal with the establishment of
precise and uniform limits of national
jurisdiction over the resources of the
seabed and subsoil. 4 9 A machinery was
set up to determine the agenda, date,
location, and duration of the conference, and since 1971 six preparatory
sessions have been held in Geneva and
New York. The Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the
Ocean Boor Beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction, usually called the
Seabed Committee, formed three subcommittees, each charged with specific
responsibilities. Of the three, Subcommittee II is responsible to prepare a
comprehensive list of subjects and issues
concerning the Continental Shelf, the
territorial sea and the contiguous zone,
fishing and conservation of the living
resources of the high seas, and to
prepare draft treaty articles thereon. 5 0
The basic problem is to accommodate the needs and interests of the
coastal states who demand an extension
of resource jurisdiction with the interests of other states and the world
community at large.
For the developing countries involved in the dispute, extension of
exclusive jurisdiction over resources
beyond the territorial sea is the single
most important issue. Spearheaded by a
small group of Latin American countries
claiming a 200-mile maritime zone, the

demand for protection of resources
beyond a narrow territorial sea gained
momentum during the 1960's and has
found widespread acceptance in Africa
and Asia in recent years.
The first in a series of developments
suggesting a trend toward acceptance of
a 200-mile limit was the Declaration of
Montevideo of August 1970, whereby
nine Latin American States specifically
recognized the right of coastal states to
extend national jurisdiction to a distance of 200 nautical miles, measured
from the baseline of the territorial
limits. 5 1 A few months later a larger
number of Latin American States
meeting in Lima, Peru, confirmed the
right of coastal states to establish the
limits of maritime jurisdiction "in accordance with reasonable criteria,
having regard to its geographical, geological and biological characteristics,
and the need to make rational use of its
resources. ,,52 Following the Montevideo and Lima declarations, the Caribbean countries met in Santo Domingo in
July 1972 and agreed on what could
become a universal formula to reconcile
nations demanding narrow territorial
limits and those claiming jurisdiction
out to 200 nautical miles. The Caribbean nations introduced a new concept,
the "patrimonial sea" of 200 miles, in
which states would have sovereign rights
over all ocean resources. Territorial
limits would be restricted to 12 miles. 53
At a seminar of high-level government
officials in Yaounde' (Ivory Coast) in
June of the same year, participants
recommended to African States to extend their jurisdiction over all the resources of the high seas area adjacent to
their territorial sea within an economic
zone to be established. 54 A year later,
in May 1973, the Council of Ministers
of the Organization of African Unity
recognized the right of coastal states to
establish an exclusive economic zone
not exceeding 200 nautical miles. 5 5
China, Canada, Australia, and a growing
number of others, particularly de-
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veloping countries, appear ready to
endorse the concept.
At the preparatory conferences for
the law of the sea, which have been held
in Geneva and New York since 1970,
some countries have proposed a uniform
limit of 200 miles within which coastal
states will have exclusive jurisdiction
over all resources, pollution, and scientific research. Others, with broad continental margins, want to extend exclusive jurisdiction to the outer edge of the
margins beyond 200 miles, and a number of landlocked and shelf-locked
states prefer a limit of 200 meters or 40
miles, with an additional intermediate
zone of 40 miles within which the
coastal state would have preferential
and veto rights over exploitation. If
accepted, the latter proposal would reserve some two-fifths of the world's
estimated recoverable offshore oil and
gas resources for the international community. The Soviet Union, with its
extensive, shallow Arctic Sea, has
proposed to limit coastal state jurisdiction to a depth of 500 meters or 100
miles, whichever is further from shore,
and the United States propounds a
Coastal Seabed Economic Area within
which the coastal state could exercise
exclusive jurisdiction (subject to certain
provisions) out to 200 miles or to the
edge of the continental margins. The
new U.S. proposal would leave the
international community little of any
valuable oil and gas resources.
Agreements on the limits of national
jurisdiction over seabed resources are
compounded by considerable differences of opinion over fisheries. While
proponents of a simple 200-mile economic or resource zone tend to stress
coastal state rights in the area, they are
usually silent on coastal states duties.
They also overlook the management
problems arising from the adoption of a
200·mile economic zone. Maritime
states that have traditionally fished in
distant waters (U.S.S.R., Japan, and
others) are opposed to granting coastal

states exclusive jurisdiction over living
resources out to 200 miles. Japan and
the Soviet Union recognize the special
interest of coastal states beyond territorial limits but maintain that regulatory measures should be established in
agreement with other states engaged in
fishing in the area. The positions of
most coastal developing nations and
nations possessing long-range fleets are
still far apart on the degree of management responsibilities and catch allocation rights of coastal states in the areas
adjacent to a 12-mile territorial sea. The
United States, with mixed coastal and
distant interests, does not favor any
specific limit to exclusive fishing rights,
but its proposals provide for coastal
state jurisdiction over coastal and anadromous species to the full extent of
their migratory range. 5 6
As the final outcome is expected to
be a package deal, the resources issue
cannot be debated in complete isolation
from other problems. These include
questions of transit through straits used
by international traffic, the limits of the
territorial sea, the nature and management of the international regime beyond the economic zone, et cetera.
Many proponents of extensive coastal
state jurisdiction are primarily interested in resources and are willing to
give in to maritime nations' demand for
narrow territorial limits, provided that
their resource interests will be protected. The United States and other
maritime powers, in turn, are prepared
to accept extension of territorial limits
to 12 miles and coastal state jurisdiction
over resources beyond the territorial
sea, provided there is agreement on free
transit through straits used for international navigation and that the interests of both the states and the international community are recognized in
the economic zone. Provided that general agreement on all major issues will
be reached, acceptance of a 200-mile
economic zone appears likely, with
some compensation to states with wide
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continental margins.
Recent increases in the price of crude
oil will have a negative effect on the
economies of many developing countries, and this, in turn, may serve as an
additional incentive to claim the resources of the entire potentially oil-rich
continental margins. In light of this fact,
the United States insists on safeguards
for its oil drilling industry, in the form
of a security of investment clause and
on compulsory dispute settlement.
Initial capital outlays for development
of oilfields beneath the seabed are very
high, and it takes years before the first
revenue can be expected. Such vast
investments can only be made if they
are protected by international agreement and if, in case of serious disagreements, disputes will be subject to compulsory claims settlement. Security of
investment is in the interests of both the
investors and the coastal states with
offshore resources. Most developing
coastal states rely on foreign capital for
the exploration and exploitation of
their offshore petroleum resources, and
the willingness of these international
investors to meet capital demands will
be significantly enhanced by the degree
of security provided to the companies
developing the offshore resources.
The new Law of the Sea Conference
is scheduled to commence in Caracas,
Venezuela, in August 1974 and will last
until draft treaties are completed and
agreed upon. Acceptance of exclusive
national jurisdiction for the exploration
and exploitation of seabed resources
extending out to 200 miles from the
coast, or even over the entire continental margins, is likely to result in optimum resources exploitation, provided
that articles related to security of investment and compulsory claims settlement
are included.
Ocean Oil and the Energy Crisis.
Although one may expect that offshore
petroleum production will grow at a
faster rate than predicted prior to the
I

recent price hikes, it is not likely to
solve our worldwide energy problems.
These are the result of not only limited
resources but of Government interference with the market system and,
more recently, the creation of an artificial shortage by the major petroleum
exporting nations.
Before the Arab embargo, oil needs
in the United States were calculated to
increase by 25 percent between 1972
and 1976,5 7 but in view of higher prices
and conservation measures, the actual
increase may be somewhat lower. As
domestic onshore production reached
its peak in 1970 and no North Slope oil
is expected to reach the market until
the late 1970's, additional supplies have
to be imported.
Recent Government policy to allow
the price of old and new domestic crude
to rise considerably will certainly lead
to a renewed search for additional reserves. Moreover, higher prices will
make it economical to increase output
from existing wells onshore and offshore with secondary and tertiary recovery techniques. However, while potential offshore resources are known to
be substantial, it takes between 4~ and
9~ years between the time when funds
are committed for exploration and
actual full production. On average, it
takes from 1 to 3 years of geophysical
work to locate a commercially attractive
oilfield and another 2 years of exploratory drilling before oil is found.
Once petroleum is located, it takes
about 6 to 18 months to build production platforms and to set them in place
and another 2 to 3 years to bring a
platform to full production.
President Nixon's recent energy
policy has improved our long-term
energy oudook, but, even under the
most optimistic conditions, the National
Petroleum Council has estimated that
we will still be dependent for 11 percent
of total energy needs from foreign
sources of supply by 1985. 58 The question is, from where? Currently we
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import most of our foreign oil from
Canada and Venezuela, but Western
Hemisphere sources have almost reached
their limits, and consequently most of
the additional imports will have to be
supplied by such areas as the Middle
East and North Africa. Aside from the
danger of reliance on vital energy supplies from politically unstable sources,
the Assistant Secretary for Energy and
Minerals of the Department of the
Interior, Stephen A. Wakefield, said that
" ... considering the effect of recent oil
increases on the economies of the eastern hemisphere producing nations, their
production rates would in all probability not be expanded enough to meet
the combined .1980 projected demands
of Europe, Japan and the U.S. at any
price ... ,,59
Hence, additional world demand
must be met from other sources of
supply to meet even a downward adjusted demand for petroleum and to
prevent potential serious conflict between the United States and its allies

I

over Middle East imports. The continental margins of the world offer a unique
solution to our medium-term energy
problems. In contrast to onshore petroleum resources, offshore prospects are
more evenly divided among the nations
of the five continents. Diversification of
exploratory and development activities
is a good guarantee against future supply interruptions for political or economic reasons. However, it will take
several years and vast amounts of capital
to search for and produce from new
offshore fields. In the meantime, growing dependence on the Middle East
cannot" be avoided, regardless of successes in our search for new sources of
supply. The economic, political, and
military consequences are obvious, and
it will take superior leadership to bridge
the temporary domestic and worldwide
energy shortage while avoiding an economic recession at home and a dangerous scramble for limited supplies between the countries of the Western
alliance.
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